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Abstract
In the 2008 Budget Review, the South African government announced its intention to levy
a 2c/kWh tax on the sale of electricity generated from non-renewable sources. This measure is
intended to serve a dual purpose of helping to manage the current electricity supply shortages
and to protect the environment (National Treasury 2008). An electricity generation tax is set
to have an impact on the South African economy. However, several instruments have been
proposed in the literature to protect the competitiveness and economy of a country when it
imposes a green tax, one of these remedies being border tax adjustments.This paper evaluates
the eﬀectiveness for the South African case, of border tax adjustments (BTAs) in counteracting
the negative impact of an electricity generation tax on competitiveness. The remedial eﬀects of
the BTAs are assessed in the light of their ability to maintain the environmental beneﬁts of the
electricity generation tax. Additionally, the the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model
is used to evaluate the impact of an electricity generation tax on the South African, SACU
and SADC economies and to explore the possibility of reducing the economic impact of the
electricity generation tax through BTAs. The results show that an electricity generation tax
will lead to a contraction in South African gross domestic product (GDP). Traditional BTAs
a r eu n a b l et oa d d r e s st h e s en e g a t i v ei m p a c ts. We propose a reversedBTA approach where
gains from trade are utilised to counteract the negative eﬀects of an electricity generation tax,
while retaining the environmental beneﬁts associated with the electricity generation tax. This
is achieved through a lowering of import tariﬀs, as this will reduce production costs and thereby
restore the competitiveness of the South African economy. The reduction in import tariﬀsn o t
only negates the negative GDP impact of the electricity generation tax, but the bulk of CO2
abatement from the electricity generation tax is retained.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the 2008 Budget Review, the South African government announced its intention to levy a 2c/kWh
tax on the sale of electricity generated from non-renewable sources. This tax is to be collected at
the source, from the producers/generators of electricity. This measure is intended to serve a dual
purpose of helping to manage the current electricity supply shortages and to protect the environment
(National Treasury 2008).
Since the electricity generation tax is set to have an impact on the economy, in particular its
competitiveness, measures to counter the negative eﬀects while retaining pollution abatement bene-
ﬁts ought to be investigated. Several instruments have been proposed in the literature, one of which
is border tax adjustments (BTAs).
.. This paper evaluates the eﬀectiveness, for the South African case, of border tax adjustments
(BTAs) in counteracting the negative impact of an electricity generation tax on competitiveness. The
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1remedial eﬀects of the BTAs are assessed in the light of their ability to maintain the environmental
beneﬁts of the electricity generation tax. If traditional BTAs are unable to achieve this, we will
propose a new approach, which we refer to as “reversed BTAs”. With this approach, gains from trade
could be used to negate the negative eﬀects of an electricity generation tax, while the environmental
beneﬁts associated with the electricity generation tax are retained
The next section provides an economic rationale for an electricity generation tax and examines
the instruments available to reduce or eliminate the negative economic eﬀects of such a tax. Section
3 provides an overview of the South African industries with regards to electricity needs, domestic
production and export shares. Also, the average weighted tariﬀsa sa p p l i e dt ot h ed i ﬀerent products
and regions are discussed. In the fourth section, the model and data are discussed. This is followed
by an analysis of the results in section ﬁve. Section six concludes.
2 Literature Review 1
2.1 Electricity generation tax: an economic rationale
Fossil fuel use creates negative externalities, such as CO2 emissions. These externalities can be
internalised through the price mechanism with the use of certain economic measures. This has the
potential to achieve, at the least cost to the economy, environmental targets. The goal is equalised
marginal abatement costs across all agents, ensuring that action is taken where it is the cheapest
and most eﬃcient (UP 2007). The two most prevalent economic measures in this context are taxes
on emissions (or proxies of emissions) and tradable emission permits schemes (UP 2007).
According to McKibben and Wilcoxen (2002), a tax on emissions is more eﬃcient than a permit
system, especially under uncertainty. Furthermore, Rosen (1999) noted that the relevant issue is
whether the measure employed is better than other alternatives, rather than whether or not it is a
perfect measure to deal with externalities.
Environmental improvements are realised through price increases in environmentally harmful
products. These price increases will result in a reduced demand for the products, reducing the
quantity supplied and the associated emissions. However, existing exemptions and other special
provisions aimed at protecting economies against the negative impacts of environmental taxes, re-
strict the environmental eﬀectiveness and economic eﬃciency of environmental taxes. Removing
these restrictions could create conﬂict with two main political concerns that currently impede the
wider use of environmentally related taxes, namely the potential negative distributional eﬀects and
the potential loss of competitiveness (OECD 2001).
Regarding the competitiveness impacts, the authorities are responsible for stating clearly the
objectives of the environmentally related taxes from the outset (OECD 2001). Due to vested in-
terests within industry, energy taxes cannot be implemented without signiﬁcant measures to reduce
the impact on, at least, the worsthit sectors (OECD 2001). This applies in particular if the tax
is implemented in a unilateral fashion. Where non-global environmental taxes increase prices of
internationally traded goods, imports will become more attractive and exports less attractive in the
taxing country. Therefore, domestic production is expected to decline, at least in the short run,
leading to adjustments in the national economy as well as job losses (De Kam 2002).
The competitiveness impact is likely to be signiﬁcant if the products or factors of production
aﬀected by the environmentally related taxes are traded widely, without signiﬁcant import protection
or other BTAs. It is therefore also likely that the competitiveness concerns are strongest if an
environmentally related tax aﬀects these products or factors of production. Another critical factor is
substitution possibilities, since limited scope to identify and ﬁnance cleaner production technologies
implies limitations on the ability to substitute away from environmental taxes (De Kam 2002). On
1This part of the paper is the product of commissioned research for The National Treasury (South Africa) which
was funded by AUSAid. The authors would like to thank ASSET Research and CoPS for facilitating the project.
2the other hand, if an environmentally related tax is levied on products or factors of production that
are not widely traded, with limited import and export possibilities and that are easily substituted
with cleaner technologies, competitiveness concerns are likely to be less pressing.
A world-wide characteristic of existing environmental taxes is the presence of tax relief and
exemptions for certain sectors, speciﬁcally in the manufacturing sector (Ekins and Speck 1999).
However, preserving competitiveness goes beyond the implementation of proper compensation mea-
sures; indeed, competitiveness concerns ought to be incorporated during the design phase of the
environmental tax. Although it is common practice in energy taxation to oﬀer tax relief or exemp-
tions to internationally exposed, energyintensive sectors, this practice could be criticised. The tax
relief and exemptions are counterintuitive as they distort the goal of environmental taxes, which is
to equalise marginal abatement costs across the economy. It should be noted that this goal is one
of the main reasons why economic measures are seen to be more eﬃcient than commandandcontrol
measures (UP 2007).
2.2 Instruments to limit the impact of environmental taxes on competi-
tiveness
If an environmentally related tax is imposed unilaterally, instead of multilaterally, signiﬁcantly larger
decreases may realise in production of the country and sectors concerned. The larger the group of
countries that impose the environmental tax, the more limited the impacts on sectoral and individual
country competitiveness (OECD 2001).
The OECD (2001) proposes several options to protect the competitiveness of a country when
implementing environmentally related taxes:
• Environmentally motivated reforms should be integrated with broader ﬁscal reforms.
• T h ei n t r o d u c t i o no fn e wt a x e so rr a t ei n c r e ases should be announced well in advance.
• If exemptions and rebates are given for competitiveness reasons in certain industries, impose
the full tax rate, but channel part of the tax revenue back to the industry in such a way that
marginal abatement incentives are maintained.
• Ensure that ﬁrms, who beneﬁt from exemptions and reductions, sign up to stringent mitiga-
tion measures. This should limit the negative environmental eﬀects of the exemptions and
reductions.
• A two-tier rate structure, with lower rates for internationally exposed sectors is a more eﬀective
and eﬃcient option than full exemptions for some sectors.
According to Stern (2006), the dynamic impacts of the transformation to a low-GHG economy
should be relatively small. Relative prices will change as the social cost of carbon is incorporated into
production activities. However, these changes are well within the normal range of variation in prices
as experienced in an open economy. The short-run primary cost increases from an environmental
tax that reﬂects the damage from emissions are likely to be far smaller than inputcost variations
from ﬂuctuations in, for example, the world oil price or the exchange rate.
Barde and Braathen (2002) suggest that countries can adopt two strategies in addressing com-
petitiveness concerns. The ﬁrst strategy is to wait for other countries to take the initiative. However,
if no country is willing to take the lead, no action will be taken, even if all countries are convinced
that environmental taxes are the best method to reduce emissions. The second strategy is to intro-
duce environmental taxes unilaterally, but with special provisions to protect internationally exposed
sectors and thereby protecting the country’s competitiveness. Without exception, OECD countries,
when introducing environmentally related taxes, have used one or more of the following instruments
to soften the impact on sectors most aﬀected (De Kam 2002):
3• revenue recycling,
• exemptions for speciﬁc activities, sectors or products,
• reduced tax rates for certain sectors, products or inputs, or
• border tax adjustments.
These instruments will now be discussed in more detail.
2.2.1 Revenue recycling
The OECD (2001) looks at diﬀerent approaches that could maintain abatement beneﬁts of environ-
mental taxes, while at the same time limiting the burden on aﬀected ﬁrms and industries. The ﬁrst
option is to recycle a part of the tax revenue back to the aﬀected ﬁrms. This approach is illustrated
in Figure 1.
A number of governments have implemented environmental taxes in such a way that revenues
are recycled fully back to the taxpayer. The environmental eﬀectiveness of tax reform will be greater
if the revenue recycling is based on factors that are independent from environmental damage, rather
than exemptions and reduced rates for aﬀected sectors. This independent recycling will maintain the
abatement incentives, since the price signal to polluters is not diluted. In other words, the tax burden
increases with the environmental damage done (De Kam 2002). For example, revenue recycling
through a reduction in labour taxes might lead to an overall eﬃciency in the tax system, as long
as labour is over-taxed compared to other factors of production (UP 2007). However, earmarking
the tax revenue ﬁxes the use of the revenue, which creates an obstacle for the re-evaluation and
modiﬁcation of the tax and spending programmes. In the case of earmarking, policymakers should
evaluate the economic and environmental rationale regularly to avoid ineﬃcient spending (OECD
2001).
2.2.2 Exemptions and reduced tax rates
Exemptions and reduced tax rates (Figure 2), the second and third options mentioned by De Kam
(2002), are present in every environmental tax ever implemented. Normally ﬁrms qualify for an
exemption if they meet certain criteria, where the ﬁrst criterion usually relates to some measure of
energy intensity (UP 2007).
Current tax systems tend to “favour” certain energy products, especially coal. The coal sector
has gained either complete or partial exemption in many countries due to strong political inﬂuence
(UP 2007). For instance, the political inﬂuence of the coal sector prevented the United Kingdom
Climate Change Levy (UK CCL) from becoming a real carbon tax, which would have meant a higher
tax rate on coal. Although the energy tax directive set a minimum tax rate for coal, the use of coal
for electricity generation and non-fuel inputs in industrial processes are exempted in the directive
(UP 2007).
2.2.3 Border tax adjustments
The ﬁnal option mentioned by De Kam (2002) to protect industries against the negative competi-
tiveness impact of an environmental tax is BTAs, which are illustrated in Figure 3.
Governments can attempt to restrict the tax burden of an environmental tax on domestic con-
sumption through the implementation of BTAs. Exporters are refunded for the environmental tax
paid on exported products, while imported products are taxed. These taxes could be based on the
characteristics of the technology used in the production of the concerned products. However, BTAs
tend to be imprecise and the administrative and compliance costs could be high. There is also the
4potential that countries might use BTAs to favour domestic producers. BTAs might even be judged
by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to be undue protection of national interest (UP 2007).
Ismer and Neuhoﬀ (2004) address the issue of information constraints in the implementation
of BTAs and propose an indirect approach to induce participants to reveal information. They
conclude, in the case of electricity, that adjustments should follow Carbon Emission Certiﬁcate price
increases, relative to a situation without these Certiﬁcates. Alexecva-Talebi, Löschel and Mennel
(2008) compare the eﬀectiveness of BTAs and Integrated Emission Trading (IET). They ﬁnd BTAs
to be more eﬀective in protecting domestic competitiveness, and IET more eﬀective in reducing
foreign emissions.
Debate regarding BTAs dates back to the adoption of Value Added Tax (VAT) in the European
Union in the early 1960s. Following the 1958 Neumark Committee, it was agreed that the European
VAT system would be administered on a destination basis, involving taxes on imports and rebates
on exports (Lockwood and Whalley 2008). Initially this was viewed by US business as conferring
a trade advantage on the EU, and the US pushed for a negotiation on BTAs as part of the Tokyo
Round in the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) (Lockwood and Whalley 2008). The
issue of BTAs was later examined by a GATT working party in 1970 (Goh 2004).
BTAs reappeared in national policy debates on the use of economic instruments to counter global
warming. For example, in 1996 a Research Panel Report of the Japanese Environment Agency
(Goh 2004), suggested the use of BTAs to address carbon leakage. However, the debate centred
mostly on WTO compatibility of BTAs (Ismer and Neuhoﬀ 2007). Although there are currently no
BTA measures in place to oﬀset the competitiveness impact of environmental taxes, two diﬀerent
bills relating to BTAs are currently under discussion in the US Senate (Lockwood and Whalley
2008). Furthermore, the harmonising of EU energy taxes between member states is likely to provide
momentum to the BTA debate (Goh 2004).
Although BTAs involve both import tariﬀs and export rebates, if both import tariﬀsa n de x p o r t
rebates were implemented simultaneously, the principle of neutrality might come into play and
render BTAs ineﬀective (Meade 1974). However, the WTO has a clear set of stringent rules for
export rebates as a result of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round and Tokyo Round of
trade negotiations (Pugel 2007). Since import tariﬀs are more likely to be implemented than export
rebates, and to avoid the neutrality principle, this paper will consider only import tariﬀs.
There seems to be no literature which explores the possibility of reversing BTAs, where gains
from trade can be used to counter the competitiveness eﬀects of an environmental tax.
3 South African Electricity Consumption and Tariﬀ Protec-
tion Proﬁle
3.1 South African industries: Production, export and electricity needs
South African electricity usage is characterised by a few energy-intensive industries as shown in Table
1. The mining and extraction industry contributes only 3 percent to domestic production at market
prices and 14.58 percent to exports at market prices, but consumes more than 50 percent of electricity.
Also, the “Electricity” and “Utility and construction” industries consume 25 percent of electricity,
but only contribute 6.17 percent to domestic production and 0.58 percent to exports at market
prices2. On the other hand, “Grains and Crops”, “Livestock and Meat products”, “”Processed
food” as well as “Textiles and Clothing” together consume 0.29 percent of electricity, but contribute
11.17 percent of domestic production and 11.45 percent of exports at market prices.
2However, it should be noted that these sectors are important providers of raw materials, to manufacturing in
particular.
53.2 Industrial tariﬀ protection by region
South Africa pursued an import substitution policy, through high trade tariﬀs and physical import
controls, during the 1960s and 1970s (Gunnar and Subramanian, 2000).An import surcharge was
introduced during 1985, but this system was replaced by the Generalised Export Incentive Scheme
(GEIS) in 1990 (Ssekabira Ntege and Harmse 2003). At that time South Africa had a highly
complex trade regime, with more than 13 000 tariﬀ lines (Roberts 2000). Since the 1990s, South
Africa liberalised its trade regime. Various tariﬀs were phased out over a ﬁve-year period starting in
1995 (Gunnar and Subramanian, 2000). The liberalisation also included the termination of GEIS by
1997, liberalisation of sensitive industries over an eight-year period, reduction in tariﬀ lines, and the
replacement of quantitative restrictions imposed on agricultural imports (Gunnar and Subramanian,
2000).
The number of eight-digit tariﬀ lines was reduced to 6 618 in 2009. Furthermore, the number
of tariﬀ lines in the South African Tariﬀ Book compared favourably with international standards,
with 53 percent of these tariﬀ lines at zero in 2009 (ITAC 2009). Formula duties comprised only
1.8 percent of the tariﬀ lines in 2009, compared to 25 percent in the early 1990s, and are mainly
applicable to agricultural products.
In an attempt to negate the negative economic impact of an electricity generation tax through
BTAs, industry protection through the implementation of import tariﬀs ought to be considered. The
average weighted ad valorem tariﬀs by industry per region are shown in Table 2.
The absence of tariﬀsr e ﬂects the free movement of goods and services within the Southern African
Customs Union (SACU). “Processed Food” and “Textiles and Clothing” are the most protected
industries in trade between South Africa and the rest of SADC. In addition to these two industries,
“Light Manufacturing” is also protected by relatively high tariﬀs in trade between South Africa and
the European Union as well as the rest of the world. Overall, import tariﬀs from the EU to South
Africa are lower than the import tariﬀs from the rest of the world to South Africa, due to the Trade
Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between South Africa and the EU.
In the next section, the model and data are discussed. This is followed by an analysis of the
results.
4 Model and Data
4.1 Introduction
This paper applies the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, which is coordinated by
the Centre for Global Trade Analysis at Purdue University. The GTAP model is the pre-eminent
modelling framework for the analysis of trade and environmental issues across countries,
(www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu). Nearly all analyses of Free Trade Agreements by governments
and individual academics have utilised aspects of the GTAP model and/or database.
4.2 The GTAP model
GTAP, a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, is designed for comparative
static analysis of trade-related issues. GTAP databases are deﬁned in terms of three primary sets,
namely the set of countries and regions, the set of primary factors and the set of sectors and
produced commodities (Rutherford and Paltsev 2000). The aggregation of GTAP used for this model
distinguishes four regions as shown in Table 3, namely South Africa, SACU countries excluding South
Africa, SADC countries excluding SACU and the rest of the world. Table A1 in the Appendix shows
the aggregation of the 57 GTAP sectors into 11 sectors. Furthermore, there are three other agents
in each region, namely the government, a capital creator and a representative household.
6International transport margins are explicitly modelled in the GTAP model, while a consumer
demand system is designed to capture diﬀerential price and income responsiveness across countries.
Also, a global bank is designed to mediate between world savings and investment (Hertel and Will
1999). The GTAP uses macroeconomic data to update the regional input-output tables to a common
base year — 2004 for the GTAP database used in this paper. All the coeﬃcients in the regional input-
output models are initially in national currency units and then scaled-up to external GDP data in
2004 US dollars. Then, gross capital formation, government consumption and private consumption
are used to update the values for these aggregates in the regional input-output tables (Hertel 1997).
The behaviour of agents is optimised in competitive markets and this determines the regional
demand and supply of goods and services in GTAP. This optimising behaviour also determines
the sector demand for primary factors (land, capital, labour and natural resources). The labour
market is disaggregated into a skilled labour market and an unskilled labour market while there is
a single, homogenous capital good. Standard comparative static applications of the model ﬁxt h e
total supplies of all endowment factors (capital, labour, land and natural resources) for each region.
For the applications reported here, we adopt a diﬀerent convention, with skilled labour ﬁxed for each
region, but unskilled labour allowed to move across regions to eliminate any initial disturbances to
real wage rates. This provides a more accurate description of the South African economy, which is
characterised by a limited supply of skilled labour in the skilled labour market and high structural
unemployment in the unskilled labour market.
Other key assumptions:
• It is assumed that the rates of commodity taxes are not aﬀected by the exogenously imposed
shocks, other than the eﬀects used to impose the shocks.
• National investment is responsive to changes in the rates of return on capital, but global
investment is assumed to be ﬁxed. Also, public as well as private consumption expenditure
and nominal saving in each region are assumed to move with regional income. Therefore, the
region beneﬁting the most from the exogenous shocks imposed will increase its share of global
investment at the expense of other regions.
• GTAP contains diﬀerent types of technicalchange variables. However, in these simulations we
assume constant technological variables. For example, an electricity generation tax has no
impact on the technological processes used in the production of electricity-intensive products.
• It is assumed that capital stocks are ﬁxed, with rates of return varying to accommodate the
unchanged capital.
4.3 The GTAP database
The simulations reported in this research study are based on a preliminary release of Version 7 of
the database. The GTAP database comprises: input/output data for each region; bilateral trade
data derived from United Nations trade statistics; and support and protection data derived from a
number of sources. Documentation for the Version 6 data set is given in Dimaranan (2006). The
Version 7 database contains estimates of production costs, ﬁnal demand values, bilateral trade values
and various tax levels for 2005.
4.4 Scenarios
The version described in the previous section is used to model two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario,
South Africa imposes a unilateral 2c/kWh tax on electricity generation. Changes in trade volumes
are those linked to a 2c/kWh increase in the tariﬀ, which is equivalent to a sector-wide weighted
average 10 percent increase in the price of electricity (Blignaut, Chitiga-Mabugu and Mabugu 2005).
The second scenario models the eﬀects of a 10 percent electricity generation tax in South Africa,
7as well as import tax adjustments to eliminate the eﬀect of the electricity tax on the real GDP
and employment of South Africa. The import tax adjustments are simulated through a proportional
reduction in import tariﬀs across all industries. Import tariﬀs are reduced to counter the reduction in
imports resulting from the electricity generation tax. We modelled diﬀerent trade-weighted import
tariﬀ percentage reductions to establish an average percentage reduction that would reverse the
negative eﬀect of the electricity tax on the real GDP. Therefore, we reverse the traditional BTA
approach, and negate the competitiveness impact of an environmental tax, through realised gains
from trade.
The shocks for the electricity generation tax were imposed via changes to output taxes in the
production of electricity. An output tax drives a wedge between the price received by producers and
the price paid in the market.
5R e s u l t s
A unilateral 2c/kWh electricity generation tax in South Africa will aﬀect not only the South African
economy, but also the SACU, SADC, the EU and the rest of the world, via changes in South Africa’s
export and import volumes. Seymore et al (2009) discuss the results of such an electricity generation
tax and these results are summarised in Table 2. It should be noted that revenue neutrality was also
simulated and the results reﬂected no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences from the results reported
below.
As shown in Table 4, all the macroeconomic variables, with the exception of real export volume,
decrease for South Africa. Contrary to the expected outcome, real import volume decreased by 0.69
percent and real export volume increased by 0.7 percent. Seymore et al (2009) explain that this is
the result of the decline in domestic demand for domestic production outweighing the reduction in
production, which leads to lower domestic prices and an increase in exports. Imports decreased due
to lower domestic demand.
The higher production costs translate into job losses, with unskilled employment contracting by
0.77 percent. Skilled employment wages decrease by -1.05 percent due to the contraction in real
GDP.
As discussed above, one method that could be utilised to counter the negative impact of the
electricity tax is BTAs. However, as shown in Table 4, South Africa will experience an increase in
exports. Therefore, export subsidies will not be an eﬀective approach towards negating the eﬀect of
the electricity tax on the competitiveness of the country.
Imports, on the other hand, are set to decrease. Since production inputs are priced at import
parity pricing, a reduction in import tariﬀs will reduce production costs and thereby restore South
African competitiveness. Therefore, the appropriate action to counter the contraction in South
African GDP as well as the increase in unemployment, is a reduction in import tariﬀs. Scenario
2 modelled diﬀerent trade weighted import tariﬀ reductions to establish an average reduction level
that would reverse the negative eﬀect of the electricity tax on the real GDP, and result in a constant
real GDP3. The new revised tariﬀs are provided in Table 6. The average required reduction in
import tariﬀs was calculated at 29 percent. The low baseline of the tariﬀs explains the relatively
high result.
As shown in Table 6, the import tax adjustments could succeed in neutralising the eﬀect of an
electricity generation tax on real GDP, although this will be at the cost of weaker terms of trade.
Nevertheless, international trade will be stimulated and exports are expected to increase by 2.75
percent and imports are expected to increase by 2.24 percent. This will result in a 0.46 percent
improvement in the South African trade balance. Furthermore, it should be noted that under
scenario 2, government spending decreases by 0.11 percent, as compared to 0.17 percent under
scenario 1.
3This was done through a trail and error.
8On an industry level, “Grains and Crops” and “Heavy Manufacturing” at 0.57 percent and 0.56
percent respectively, are set to record the highest increase in production, while “Textile, Clothing
and Footwear” are set to decrease output by 2.91 percent. This is in line with expectations, as the
“Grains and Crops” and “Heavy Manufacturing” industries are highly reliant on capital imports
and fuel to increase production. On the other hand, the Textile, Clothing and Footwear industry
will be even more exposed to a highly competitive international market. This will probably cause
some relatively unproductive producers to exit the market.
We also tested for a neutral unskilled employment policy, where the negative impacts on employ-
ment and wages of an electricity generation tax was countered through tariﬀ reductions. A 39.98
percent reduction in the overall level of baseline tariﬀs was found to be appropriate.
It is important to note that the proposed tariﬀ reductions will be in line with the current trade
liberalisation policy approach in South Africa. As discussed in Part 3, South Africa is not only
simplifying the South African Tariﬀ Book, but is also committed towards tariﬀ reductions.
The CO2 abatement before and after the reversed BTAs has been calculated. This was done using
the greenhouse gas emissions inventory as developed by Blignaut, Chitiga-Mabugu and Mabugu
(2005). Economic beneﬁts accruing to CO2 abatement was calculated at R100 per ton, based on a
low estimate of approximately 8 euros for a Certiﬁable Emissions Reduction Certiﬁcate. As reﬂected
in Table 7, reversed BTAs will reduce the CO2 reduction beneﬁt from R 970 million to R 824 million.
This small forfeiture of CO2 abatement beneﬁts is due to the structural shift in the economy towards
non-energy intensive sectors, as shown in Table 6.
The Stroud quadrature method was used to conduct a sensitivity analysis. The model was solved
22 times and the price elasticity for electricity demand? in the South African economy (0.47) has
been found to be robust at a 10 percent variation.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The South African government, in the 2008 Budget Review, announced its intention to levy a
2c/kWh tax on the sale of electricity generated from non-renewable sources. This tax is to be
collected at the source from the producers/generators of electricity. This measure is intended to
serve a dual purpose of helping to manage the current electricity supply shortages and to protect
the environment (National Treasury 2008).
An electricity generation tax is set to have an impact on the South African economy. However,
several instruments have been proposed in the literature to protect the competitiveness and economy
of a country when imposing a green tax, one of these being BTAs.
The primary objective of this paper was to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of border tax adjustments
to negate the competitiveness and economic impacts of such an electricity generation tax, without
sacriﬁcing the environmental beneﬁts of the tax, in the case of South Africa. The paper ﬁrstly
provided an economic rationale for an electricity generation tax and examined the instruments
available to reduce or eliminate the negative economic eﬀects of such a tax.
In the next section, the paper considered the South African industry structure in terms of elec-
tricity intensity of production as well as contribution to domestic production and exports.
In the fourth section, the model and data were discussed. This was followed by an analysis
of the results. The results showed that, an electricity generation tax will lead to a contraction
in South African GDP. However, traditional BTAs were unable to address these negative impacts.
We proposed a reversedBTA approach where gains from trade were utilised to negate the negative
impacts of an electricity generation tax, while retaining the environmental beneﬁts associated with
the electricity generation tax. This was achieved through a reduction in import tariﬀs, as this
reduction will reduce production costs and thereby restore South African competitiveness. The
reduction in import tariﬀs not only negated the negative GDP impact of the electricity generation
tax, but the bulk of CO2 abatement from the electricity generation tax was retained.
9The multi-country GTAP model focuses on the interaction between countries arising from the
ﬂow of goods and services. The representation of investment and savings leakages is relatively weak
and it does not record the possible inter-country shifts of physical and ﬁnancial assets that may
arise from the electricity generation tax. Also, the entire demand system is treated as the demand
system of a representative household. There is eﬀectively only one household, and it is not possible
to analyse the welfare eﬀects of the electricity tax on diﬀerent households.
The GTAP version used in this paper is not dynamic, but rather a static model. Thus, there is no
allowance for inter-temporal linkages between savings and consumption, and investment and capital.
The model is able to project likely capital changes by region and industry associated with the tax,
but there are no endogenous mechanisms that allow projections of the time-pattern of investment
changes which lead to the projected capital changes. Also, short-term and long-term adjustment
costs associated with the tax cannot be properly analysed in a static framework.
The emergence of new industries, such as nuclear or coal generation with carbon capture are not
endogenously incorporated into the model. The model user must therefore exogenously introduce
new industries, with the timing and size of the new industries speciﬁed by the modeller. In this
paper, it is assumed that no new industries emerge as result of the 2c/kWh electricity tax. Thus,
the impact analysis is a relatively short to mediumterm analysis.
No attempt is made in these simulations to include the possible eﬀect of climate change in the base
case. There are no assumptions made about the possible costs under “business as usual” resulting
from climate change. For example, we do not assume an increase in the demand for electricity
resulting from desertiﬁcation leading to an increased need for irrigation. Not allowing for climate
change implies that we also do not account for any of the possible economic beneﬁts arising from
abatement achieved by the electricity generation tax.
Although this paper attempted to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of BTAs in negating the competitive-
ness and economic impacts of an electricity generation tax, given the limitations above, it might be
useful to extend this analysis to a dynamic CGE model, or to allow the emergence of new industries
due to the electricity generation tax.
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11Table 1: Electricity consumption, contribution to GDP and international trade by industry in 















Electricity 14.06  1.53 0.45 0.41
Grains and 
crops 




0.04 2.15 0.65 0.68
Mining and 
extraction 
50.89 3.05 14.58 14.98
Processed 
food 
0.05 5.21 4.77 5.38
Textiles and 
clothing 
0.20 2.22 1.90 1.92
Light 
Manufacturing 
1.95 11.15 16.38 16.38
Heavy 
Manufacturing 
8.37 18.46 44.12 43.64
Utilities and 
construction 
10.96 4.64 0.13 0.12
Transport and 
communication 
3.57 17.99 6.75 6.06
Other services  9.90  32.01 6.12 5.50
Total 100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: GTAP database, Preliminary version 7 
 
 
Table 2: Average weighted ad valorem tariffs by industry 
 
 Rest  of 
SACU 
Rest of SADC EU  Rest of the world
Electricity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Grains and crops  0.02 0.64 4.31 3.95
Livestock and meat products  0.00 0.23 5.78 10.46
Mining and extraction  0.00 0.01 0.05 0.02
Processed food  0.00 4.83 11.41 12.05
Textiles and clothing  0.00 6.42 11.68 27.07
Light Manufacturing  0.01 0.68 11.71 13.96
Heavy Manufacturing  0.00 0.00 1.60 2.96
Utilities and construction  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transport and communication  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other services  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00







Table 3: Regional aggregation of GTAP 
 
Identifier  Countries in Region 
South Africa  South Africa 
SACUexclSA  Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and Botswana 
SADCexclSACU  Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritius, Angola, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, the DRC 
and Madagascar 
EU_25  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 






Table 4: Results of a ten percent tax on the generation of electricity 
 
10 PERCENT TAX  SouthAfrica SACUexclSA SADCexclSACU EU_25 restofworld
Real GDP  -0.28 0.01 0.01  0.00  0.00
Real private consumption  -0.04 0.06 0.02  0.00  0.00
Real public consumption  -0.17 0.03 0.01  0.00  0.00
Real investment  -2.29 0.12 0.07  0.01  0.01
Real import volume  -0.69 0.13 0.04  0.00  0.00
Real export volume  0.70 0.02 0.00  0.00  -0.01
Terms of Trade  -0.15 0.06 0.02  0.00  0.00
Unskilled employment  -0.77 0.07 0.01  0.00  0.00
Skilled employment wage rate  -0.63 0.07 0.04  0.00  0.00
           
Industry production          
Electricity -4.29 1.47 0.45  0.04  0.01
Grains and crops  0.31 -0.07 -0.02  -0.01  0.00
 
Livestock and meat products 
-0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.00  0.00
Mining and extraction  -0.35 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Processed food  0.01 -0.06 -0.02  0.00  0.00
Textiles and clothing  0.34 0.15 -0.02  0.00  -0.01
Light Manufacturing  0.12 -0.29 -0.14  0.00  0.00
Heavy Manufacturing  -0.18 0.01 -0.09  0.00  0.00
Utilities and construction  -1.84 0.10 0.06  0.01  0.01
Transport and communication  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Other services  -0.19 0.04 0.01  0.00  0.00
Source: Seymore, R., Adams, P.D., Mabugu, M., Van Heerden, J.H. and Blignaut, J. 2009 
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Table 5: Reversed Border tax adjustments: 
South African import tariff changes (percentage points) 
 
  SACUexclSA SADCexclSACU EU_25 restofworld 
Electricity 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Grains and crops  -0.01 -0.19 -1.23  -1.13 
 
Livestock and meat products 
0.00 -0.07 -1.63 -2.82 
Mining and extraction  0.00 0.00 -0.02  -0.01 
Processed food  0.00 -1.37 -3.05  -3.20 
Textiles and clothing  0.00 -1.73 -3.12  -6.35 
Light Manufacturing  0.00 -0.20 -3.12  -3.65 
Heavy Manufacturing  0.00 -0.09 -0.47  -0.86 
Utilities and construction 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Transport and communication  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 




















Table 6: Results after border tax adjustments 
 
 SOUTH  AFRICA 
(Percentage change)
Real GDP  0.00
Real private consumption  -0.15
Real public consumption  -0.11
Real investment  -0.28
Real import volume  2.24
Real export volume  2.75
Terms of Trade  -0.50
Unskilled employment  -0.20
Skilled employment wage rate -0.12
  
Industry production   
Electricity -3.97
Grains and crops  0.57
 
Livestock and meat products 
-0.14
Mining and extraction  -0.06
Processed food  -0.02
Textiles and clothing  -2.91
Light Manufacturing  -0.70
Heavy Manufacturing  0.56
Utilities and construction  -0.28
Transport and communication  0.09



















15Table 7: CO2 abatement benefit: with and without reversed border tax adjustments 
 
















Electricity 221.14 -9.49 948.68 -8.78  877.92
Grains and crops  7.87 0.02 -2.44 0.04  -4.48
Livestock and meat 
products 
1.75 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.24
Mining and extraction  7.87 -0.03 2.75 0.00  0.47
Processed food  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Textiles and clothing  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
Light Manufacturing  16.17 0.02 -1.94 -0.11  11.32
Heavy Manufacturing  102.27 -0.18 18.41 0.57  -57.27
Utilities and 
construction 
2.62 -0.05 4.82 -0.01 0.73
Transport and 
communication 
45.01 0.00 -0.45 0.04 -4.05
Other services  2.62 0.00 0.50 0.00  -0.03
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Table A1: Sectoral aggregation of GTAP 
Identifier  Sectors in Region 
1. Electricity  Electricity 
2. GrainsCrops  Paddy rice 
Wheat 
Cereal grains nec 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
Oil seeds 
Sugar cane, sugar beet 
Processed rice 
3. MeatLstk  Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 
Animal products nec 
Raw milk 
Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse 
Meat products nec 
4. Extraction  Forestry and fishing 
Coal 
Oil and gas 
Mineral nc 
5. ProcFood  Vegetable oils and fats 
Dairy products 
Sugar 
Food products nec 
Beverages and tobacco products 
6. TextWapp  Textiles 
Wearing apparel 
7. LightMnfc  Leather products 
Wood products 
Paper products, publishing 
Metal products 
Motor vehicles and parts 
Transport equipment nec 
Manufactures nec 
8. HeavyMnfc  Petroleum, coal products 
Chemical, rubber, plasticprods 




Machinery and equipment nec 
9. Util_cons  Gas manufacture, distribution 
Water 
Construction 





11. OthServices  Financial services nec 
Insurance 
Business services nec 
Recreation and other services 
Public Admin, defence, health, education 
Dwellings 
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